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Abstract 
 
 
Some skeptics question the very possibility of moral bioenhancement by arguing 
that if we lack a widely acceptable notion of morality, we will not be able to accept the 
use of a biotechnological technique as a tool for moral bioenhancement. I will examine 
this skepticism and argue that the assessment of moral bioenhancement does not require 
such a notion of morality. In particular, I will demonstrate that this skepticism can be 
neutralized in the case of recent neurofeedback techniques. This goal will be 
accomplished in four steps. First, I will draw an outline of the skepticism against the 
possibility of moral bioenhancement and point out that a long-lasting dispute among 
moral philosophers nourishes this skepticism. Second, I will survey recent 
neurofeedback techniques and outline their three features: the variety of the target 
human faculties, such as emotion, cognition, and behavior; the flexibility or 
personalizability of the target brain state; and the nonclinical application of 
neurofeedback techniques. Third, I will argue that, by virtue of these three unique 
features, neurofeedback techniques can be a tool for moral bioenhancement without 
adopting any specific notion of morality. Fourth, I will examine the advantages and 
threats that neurofeedback-based moral enhancement may have. Finally, I will conclude 
that neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can become a new and promising tool for 
moral bioenhancement and requires further ethical investigations on its unique features. 
Keywords: neurofeedback, real-time fMRI, decoded neurofeedback, moral 
bioenhancement, notion of morality. 
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1. Skepticism about Moral Bioenhancement 
 
There is a group of criticisms regarding the very possibility of 
moral bioenhancement, which can be summarized and labeled as the 
skepticism based on the vagueness of the notion of morality. For 
example, John Shook (2012, 5) introduces its basic form as follows: “[t]he 
absence of a consensus upon the mechanisms of morality could prevent 
any agreement that a proposed moral enhancer could really be 
enhancing morality, whatever else it may be doing,” although Shook 
does not commit himself to this criticism. A variation can be found in 
Dorothee Horstkötter (2016, 123), who, pointing out that advocates of 
moral bioenhancement do “not pay attention to questions of content,” 
claims that “[l]eaving out moral values, however, renders one unable to 
distinguish between kind people made kinder and racist people 
rendered more racist.”  
These criticisms indicate that we will not be able to admit the use 
of a biotechnological technique as a tool for moral bioenhancement if we 
lack a widely acceptable notion of morality, namely, what it is like to 
be/become moral. Furthermore, this criticism can also be stated in a 
more powerful way by combining it with another argument that we can 
hardly provide a widely acceptable notion of morality in the first place. 
Committing himself to this argument, Robert Sparrow (2014, 22) claims 
that “[i]f we are going to start giving people drugs to make them more 
moral, we had better know what it is for someone to be more moral. But 
then who are advocates of moral enhancement to say that they know the 
answer to this question?” This strengthened criticism is a sort of 
skepticism about the very possibility of moral bioenhancement: this 
skepticism indicates that it will be nonsense to claim that a proposed 
biotechnological intervention is a tool for moral bioenhancement if no 
one can give a widely acceptable notion of morality in the first place.  
Those who are skeptical about moral bioenhancement have a 
reason for presuming that it is practically difficult to frame such a notion 
of morality. As the history of moral philosophy testifies, the problem of 
what it is like to be moral has been one of the most long-lasting and 
unresolved disputes among philosophers. For example, it varies among 
the three major moral theories: Kantian deontology characterizes it as 
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the good will to obey duties and excludes the value of the consequences 
of actions (Kant 1788); utilitarianism describes it from the viewpoint of 
the consequences of actions and neglects the goodness or badness of the 
will that produces them (Bentham 1789); and Aristotelian virtue ethics 
highlights human ethical character that is prior to both the will and the 
consequences (Aristotle 1998). Although these incommensurable 
characterizations are merely one example, history demonstrates that no 
one has ever established a comprehensive moral theory that integrates 
these and other moral theories for hundreds – or thousands – of years by 
providing a widely acceptable notion of morality. This fact is certainly 
evidence that we should take seriously the practical (although not 
conceptual) difficulty of framing such a notion of morality. This kind of 
skepticism about moral bioenhancement is, therefore, not merely the 
claim that the absence of a shared understanding of such a notion in 
praesenti makes it difficult to advocate for the existence of moral 
bioenhancement based on a certain type of biomedical technique. 
Rather, being fueled by a historical fact that no one has ever succeeded 
in framing it, it claims that it is the absence ad posterum that makes it 
difficult to persuasively argue the possibility of moral bioenhancement. 
A noble path to examine the possibility of moral bioenhancement 
without appealing directly to the notion of morality can be seen in a 
recent continuous debate between Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu 
(2016), and John Harris (2016) (see also Harris and Savulescu [2015]). In 
response to Harris’s question, “What exactly makes something a moral 
enhancement?” (Harris 2016, 269), Persson and Savulescu take up various 
topics concerning human morality, such as reasoning, freedom, compulsoriness, 
motivation, emotion, and the weakness of the will, and examine whether 
a biotechnological intervention manages these moral topics. This path 
would be a right and noble one to follow when considering whether the 
intervention can be entitled moral bioenhancement because these multi-
faceted considerations will gradually reveal what sort of biotechnology 
can be a tool for moral bioenhancement. 
In contrast to that approach, this study aims at considering the 
possibility of moral bioenhancement through a different path. It will 
demonstrate that, despite any skepticism, the possibility of moral 
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enhancement can be assessed without appealing to any widely 
acceptable notion of morality. 
 
 
2. Features of Recent Neurofeedback Techniques 
 
A neurofeedback technique is a kind of biofeedback technique that 
enables a subject to regulate his/her emotion, cognition, and/or behavior 
by adjusting his/her own brain states with the use of a real-time 
representation of his/her brain activities. This technique has been 
studied since the development of the electroencephalograph (EEG) 
device in the 1950s. Although EEG-based neurofeedback training is 
conducted for the therapy of mental disorders, such as epilepsy and 
autism spectrum disorder, this technique hardly became mainstream in 
the disciplines of medicine and neuroscience because doctors and 
neuroscientists evaded the EEG-based neurofeedback research, partly 
because its low spatial resolution left it unable to fully comprehend the 
neural mechanism of such disorders (Robbins 2008)3. In the 1990s, the 
development of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
advanced the research on neural mechanisms with its high spatial 
resolution, but was not useful for neurofeedback research because of its 
weak temporal resolution (ranging from a 3–16 second delay). 
Neurofeedback-based clinical research thus has to wait for new devices 
that meet both conditions, namely, high temporal resolution and high 
spatial resolution. 
Recently, technological and engineering developments have 
resulted in two kinds of new tools that satisfy these two conditions at 
once. The first tool is real-time fMRI (rtfMRI). As for the examples of 
neurofeedback research using rtfMRI, deCharms and colleagues (2005) 
report that patients who had chronic pain could reduce their pain 
perception with rtfMRI-based neurofeedback training. On the basis of 
earlier literature that the activity of the rostral anterior cingulate cortex 
(rACC) plays a crucial role in chronic pain, they set rACC as the target 
                                                 
3  Marzbani and colleagues (2016) give a review on recent EEG-based 
neurofeedback research. 
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region of interest (ROI) for their experiment. Patients were asked to 
watch a monitor on which they could see a flame, the size of which 
corresponded with rtfMRI BOLD signals of their rACC. Through 
controlling the size of the flame on the monitor, the patients 
unknowingly manipulated the activity of the rACC. After the course of 
the training, the participants’ pain perceptions were observed to be 
reduced. RtfMRI-based neurofeedback training research has been 
rapidly increasing (deCharms 2008; Weiskopf 2012). Researchers have 
reported its efficacy against other disorders, such as Parkinson’s disease 
(Subramanian et al. 2011), (major) depression (Linden et al. 2012; Young 
et al. 2017), schizophrenia (Ruiz et al. 2013), contamination anxiety 
(Scheinost et al. 2013), alcoholism (Cox et al. 2016), eating disorders 
(Bartholdy et al. 2013), and pain modulation (deCharms et al. 2005; 
Chapin et al. 2012). 
The other tool is decoded neurofeedback (DecNef) and functional 
connectivity-based neurofeedback (FCNef), which are different from the 
usual rtfMRI in that they are based on a statistical analysis of the multi-
volumetric pixel (voxel) pattern of all of the brain activity, whereas the 
rtfMRI approach uses ROI-based analysis (Norman et al. 2006; LaConte 
2011). The voxel-based analysis makes it possible to investigate 
microscopic spatial patterns of brain activity in a more specific way: 
DecNef and FCNef can be region-free neurofeedback training methods 
(Watanabe, Sasaki, Shibata et al. 2017)4. Shibata and colleagues (2011) 
demonstrate that subjects can acquire the perceptual ability to 
distinguish the orientation in a Gabor patch with DecNef training in 
controlling the size of a green circle and without showing any 
orientation figures. Currently, this technique also enables participants to 
learn associating orientation with color in early visual areas (Amano et 
al. 2016) and to change their facial preferences (Shibata et al. 2016), only 
through training in controlling the size of the metaphorical circle. As 
Shibata (2012, 1187) puts it, DecNef is a new technique that “enables us 
to test cause-and-effect relationships between neural activation in a 
                                                 
4  As for FCNef, a further cautious assessment will be required since FCNef is 
characterized as being based on resting-state functional connectivity (rs-fc), but 
the rs-fc is under dispute about its reliability (Noble et al. 2017; Winder et al. 2017). 
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target brain area and changes in perception, cognition, and behavior.” 
Recent FCNef research includes a study on reducing the severity of 
depression (Yamada et al. 2017) and a study on strengthening the 
cognitive performance of normal participants (Yamashita et al. 2017). 
Along with rtfMRI-based neurofeedback research, DecNef and FCNef 
research target their therapeutic application, especially in therapy for 
mental disorders (Watanabe, Sasaki, Shibata et al. 2017). 
Unlike other possible tools for bioenhancement, such as pharmaceutical, 
surgical, and genetic tools, the neurofeedback techniques have various 
unique features including safeness, noninvasiveness, minimum side-
effects, and compatibility with other approaches (Scharnowski and 
Weiskopf 2015; Nakazawa, Yamamoto, Tachibana et al. 2016; Sitaram et 
al. 2017). Among them, the following three features are important for 
our purpose here. The first is the variety of the target human faculties. 
As the aforementioned studies show, neurofeedback training can alter 
various human faculties, such as emotional, cognitive, and behavioral 
(abbreviated as ECB) states. The second is the flexibility or 
personalizability of the target brain state. In the case of training a certain 
type of emotion, for example, the target brain state can be calibrated and 
adjusted per participant to fit with individual specificity. In other words, 
the neurofeedback technique can provide personalized or tailor-made 
training; as Scharnowski and Weiskopf (2015, 125) state, neurofeedback 
can “be personalized to the individual needs of each participant in terms 
of the training objectives, and the target brain areas/networks.” The 
third feature is the nonclinical application of neurofeedback techniques. 
Neurofeedback studies have already been conducted on healthy 
individuals as well as those with mental disorders. 
 
 
3. Neurofeedback Training and Moral Enhancement 
 
As Gordijn and Buyx (2010) foresee, the focus of neural 
engineering in general will shift slowly but certainly from therapy to 
enhancement. As for neurofeedback techniques, some neuroethicists 
suggest that the advancement of neurofeedback research will make 
neurofeedback-based moral enhancement possible (Jotterand and 
NEUROFEEDBACK-BASED MORAL ENHANCEMENT AND THE NOTION OF MORALITY 31 
Giordano 2015; Nakazawa, Yamamoto, Tachibana et al. 2016). This 
possibility, however, similar to the other possible types of moral 
bioenhancement, is a matter of controversy among its advocates 
(Kabasenche 2016; Maslen and Savulescu 2016) and skeptics (Crutchfield 
2016; Horstkötter 2016). The skepticism against the possibility of moral 
bioenhancement based on the lack of a shared understanding of 
morality plays an important role in this controversy. As outlined in 
Section 1, a longstanding dispute among moral philosophers on this 
issue encourages this skepticism. 
However, it is worth noting that the dispute among moral 
philosophers sheds another light on human morality that the skeptics 
might overlook. That is, those different moral theories highlight and 
represent different constituents of human morality, each of which we take 
seriously in our daily lives: we appreciate, not exclusive-disjunctively 
but conjunctively, the will, behavior, and character (emotion and 
cognition), which correspond approximately to ECB5. In short, the 
goodness and badness – or in general the state – of ECB, or the 
performances of ECB, determine the human moral states. It would be 
nonsense to assume that those major moral theories do not reflect any 
aspect of our common-sense understanding of morality since, as 
Aristotle rightly puts it, well-known and long-lasting opinions represent 
aspects of truth (Aristotle 1998, VII1). Therefore, if we have no way to 
solve the dispute nor to reach a widely acceptable notion of morality, it 
might mean that our notion of morality is not so sophisticated or 
coherent. Nevertheless, it remains valid to argue that ECB performance 
plays a decisive role for our moral state or performance. Thus, the 
dispute among moral philosophers does not merely have the negative 
claim that the skeptics discern; it also permits us to draw a positive 
lesson that the apparently mutually-exclusive characterizations of 
morality between such moral theories, approximately their different 
emphases on ECB, highlight different aspects of our common-sense 
understanding of morality. Since, as mentioned in section 2, a 
                                                 
5  The will can be understood as a sort of rational decision that is based on emotion 
and cognition and occurs prior to behavior. 
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neurofeedback technique can change ECB performance, such a 
technique can be a tool for changing moral state. 
One might still argue that, even if a change in the ECB 
performance through neurofeedback training can bring about a change 
in moral performance, the change in moral performance does not 
necessarily imply that the (result of) change is a moral enhancement 
because it leaves open whether the change improves or worsens one’s 
moral performance. Here we see the problem of the notion of morality. 
This problem would not be solved by appealing to the definition of 
enhancement. For example, enhancement is defined as “any change in 
the biology or psychology of a person which increases the chances of 
leading to a good life in the relevant set of circumstances” (Savulescu et 
al. 2011, 7). Therefore, following this persuasive definition of human 
enhancement, the change in moral performance through neurofeedback 
training will rightly be moral bioenhancement if it leads to a good life in 
moral contexts, whereas it will be moral deterioration if it disturbs a good 
life in such contexts. However, this would not be helpful for our 
purpose because it remains uncertain what a good life is. Rather, this just 
sends the problem back to another and probably more complex problem 
of the vagueness of the notion of a good life. Thus, even if enhancement 
is properly defined and neurofeedback training is rightly said as a tool 
for changing human morality, it cannot be regarded as a tool for 
enhancing morality without embodying the notion of morality (and/or a 
good life). And what is worse, whatever notion of morality is adopted, it 
would hardly be accepted widely because its rival theories would not 
voice their approvals with the notion. This nourishes the skepticism 
against the very possibility of moral bioenhancement. 
Neurofeedback techniques can neutralize this skepticism on their 
use for moral bioenhancement. To elaborate upon this point, let us 
consider the two difficulties in the efficacy assessment of neurofeedback 
training on morality. The first concerns the measurement of personalized 
interventions that is also well known in psychotherapeutics. The 
psychotherapeutic procedure for mental disorders is usually so 
personalized that randomized controlled trials (RCTs) do not evaluate 
its efficacy well (Cooper 2007, chap. 9; cf. Young et al. 2017). Given that 
neurofeedback-based moral bioenhancement will be performed in a 
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personalized way, the results may not be assessed well with RCTs or 
other standard statistical procedures that are used to validate efficacy in 
typical clinical trials (Nakazawa, Yamamoto, Tachibana et al. 2016). The 
second concerns the vagueness of the notion of morality or the problem 
of making morality explicit. Even if we have a good gauge for 
measuring the efficacy of training, we may not be able to identify the 
result as moral improvement until we articulate a widely acceptable 
notion of morality.  
Each of these does show the downside of the possibility of 
neurofeedback-based moral bioenhancement. However, as a minus 
multiplied by a minus makes a plus, these two negative factors, being 
combined with each other, bring a fruitful result, namely, cancelling out 
the difficulties in the efficacy assessment of neurofeedback training on 
morality. First, an RCT is a statistical procedure to avoid subjective 
biases and provide an objective assessment of the efficacy of a scientific 
(usually medical) intervention with setting objective endpoints, blinding, 
and so on. During the course of an RCT, the moral aspects of medical 
intervention yield a subjective bias because people have different thoughts 
on what is “moral” (Jadad 1998). Therefore, in the case of assessing the 
efficacy of moral – not medical – interventions, such as moral bioenhancement, 
vagueness is unavoidably observed regarding what the outcome and the 
endpoint objective are. This is an inevitable situation in the case of 
RCT-based efficacy assessment on moral intervention since there has 
never been a consensus or a widely-acceptable notion of morality. To 
begin with, accordingly, as for a moral intervention, an RCT is not an 
appropriate way of evaluating the efficacy of moral interventions. This is 
neither the fault of RCTs nor of moral evaluation. Moral evaluation just 
does not lend itself well to RCTs.6 
Second, against the skeptics, the lack of a shared understanding of 
morality does not necessarily imply that neurofeedback training cannot 
be a tool for moral bioenhancement or, in other words, a tool for 
providing morally good results. Many activities can be identified as 
good providers without having any widely acceptable notion of the 
goodness of products. For example, presumably, people have never 
                                                 
6  Here, the second feature neutralizes the first. 
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reached any widely acceptable notion of what is considered the most 
stylish hairstyle or clothing. Nevertheless, each of us can give 
(confidently or not) our own opinion on it. Although our opinions can 
be and are divided, this does not stop us from agreeing on what 
constitutes a good hairdresser or tailor: we can agree that a hairdresser 
who can cut a customer’s hair as he/she likes is a good hairdresser and a 
tailor who can provide what his/her customer wants is a good tailor. The 
goodness of the hairdresser or tailor depends on whether he/she can 
provide what his/her customer wants, and not on whether he/she has a 
widely acceptable notion of stylish hair or clothing. A customer’s friends 
may deny (or even laugh at) the customer’s aesthetic sense because they 
have different aesthetic senses. Nevertheless, the customer and his/her 
friends will be able to reach an agreement that the hairdresser or tailor is 
good if the hairdresser or tailor provides exactly what the customer 
wants. Generally speaking, in the case of evaluating the goodness of a 
personalized or tailor-made activity, the goodness involves whether the 
activity provides the targeted result, and not whether the provider 
prefers the result. The same applies to the efficacy assessment of 
neurofeedback training on morality insofar as, being different from 
other techniques, such as pharmaceuticals, this technique is highly 
personalized or tailor-made. Schematically speaking, the more 
accurately a neurofeedback training provides what each party wants, the 
more easily Kantians and utilitarians will reach an agreement that 
neurofeedback training is a good tool for enhancing morality, without 
agreeing on a universal notion of morality.7 
Flexibility or personalizability is an important factor in assessing 
the social feasibility of moral enhancement (Harris 2016; Shook 2012; 
Sparrow 2014). All the proposed tools for moral enhancement thus far 
fail to be moral enhancements because they do not have sufficient 
flexibility to realize a variety of moral states. For example, a 
pharmaceutical that may enhance one’s deontic volitional power will be 
criticized from a utilitarian viewpoint because it cannot enhance one’s 
utilitarian disposition. Any single pharmaceutical can be criticized by 
one or another moral party insofar as it adopts different notions of 
                                                 
7  Here, the first feature neutralizes the second. 
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morality. In contrast, in the case of neurofeedback training on morality, 
by virtue of its variety of target moral faculties and its highly 
personalized or tailor-made procedure, a single device can be used for 
both deontic and utilitarian enhancements or any morality that each 
party wants. It can even enhance human vulnerability, in which some 
critics of bioenhancement discern an ethical value (Parents 1995; 
McKenny 1998). This flexibility makes neurofeedback-based moral 
enhancement a unique exception of the skepticism based on the notion 
of morality. Thus, this very feature makes it possible to use 
neurofeedback training as a tool for moral bioenhancement without 
being committed to any specific notion of morality. Accordingly, the 
skepticism can be neutralized in the case of the moral bioenhancement-
purposive use of a neurofeedback technique.8 
 
 
4. Advantages of and Threats 
    in Neurofeedback-based Moral Enhancement 
 
Neurofeedback-based moral enhancement has several advantages 
in the moral bioenhancement debate. First, as discussed thus far, it 
avoids the skepticism based on the vagueness of the notion of morality. 
Recent neurofeedback techniques, such as rtfMRI and DecNef, do not 
require a widely acceptable notion of morality to claim their eligibility to 
be used for moral bioenhancement. This means that advocates of moral 
bioenhancement can send the cumbersome problem of the notion of 
morality back to moral philosophers. 
Second, it saves moral diversity. Moral bioenhancement in general 
is sometimes blamed for its inflexibility that may lead to moral 
perfectionism and moral uniformity, which is not compatible with moral 
diversity, the value of which is socially appreciated (Sparrow 2014; 
Wiseman 2014). Neurofeedback-based moral bioenhancement would 
                                                 
8  Although this argument highlights the possibility of moral neuroenhancement, 
the same argument will be applicable for that of cognitive enhancement because 
the former includes the latter, but not vice versa (Tachibana 2009; see also Carter 
and Gordon 2015).  
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avoid this criticism because its variety of target human faculties and the 
flexibility or personalizability of the target moral state neither support 
moral perfectionism, nor bring moral uniformity, but instead save (or 
even advance) the diversity.  
Third, since the emergence of this technique, moral 
bioenhancement has become a real possibility for two reasons. The first 
is that neurofeedback research has already been conducted on healthy 
people as well as people with mental disorders. On one hand, some 
neuroscientists have shown that rtfMRI neurofeedback is effective for 
healthy subjects to self-regulate their positive and negative emotions, 
such as happiness, disgust, sadness, tenderness, and affection (Moll et al. 
2014; Sitaram et al. 2011; Zotev et al. 2011). These studies can be instances 
of neurofeedback-based enhancement on moral emotions. On the other 
hand, DecNef studies on the association of orientation with color 
(Amano et al. 2016) and the regulation of facial preferences (Shibata et al. 
2016) may realize neurofeedback-based moral enhancement to eliminate 
discrimination based on skin-color or appearance. Furthermore, as for 
other possible aspects of morality, such as empathy and altruistic 
behavior, once the neural network is statistically identified through 
leveling the brain states of moral exemplars who have such an aspect of 
morality, then neurofeedback-based moral enhancement will be 
performed by setting the statistically standardized brain state or 
network as the target figure. The second reason is the legal and 
economic features of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement. In the 
case of pharmaceutical moral bioenhancement, drug patents will have a 
disincentive for pharmaceutical moral bioenhancement for legal and 
economic reasons, such as intellectual property (Socaciu and Uszkai 
2015). In contrast, neurofeedback-based moral bioenhancement will not 
concern any intellectual-property-related issues because it only uses 
fMRI and brain data as the target figure. This system will have long-
term economic efficiency. Such scientific progress and legal or economic 
features, as well as the features mentioned above, will promote the 
realization of neurofeedback-based moral bioenhancement. By virtue of 
these advantages, this technique will certainly advance the moral 
bioenhancement debate. 
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However, we should not also fail to recognize the threats that such 
advantages may bring. Related to the first and second advantages, we 
need to examine whether this technique might intensify the differences 
among people and finally lead to moral relativism. A man of deontic 
temptation will not want to become utilitarian but more deontic, 
whereas a man of utilitarian temptation will not want to become deontic 
but more utilitarian. Generally speaking, people are inclined to enhance 
what they appreciate, regardless of whether it is physical, cognitive, or 
moral enhancement (cf. Gyngell and Easteal 2015). As this technique can 
help people realize anything they want, it may influence them to become 
increasingly different from one another. If neurofeedback-based moral 
enhancement enhances parochial morality and incites moral relativism, 
then it may neither be socially feasible nor endorsed by the family of 
nations. The problem of the lack of a shared understanding of morality 
reappears here, but in a different way. As mentioned previously, 
neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can send the cumbersome 
problem back to moral philosophers. However, this does not mean 
disregarding the problem. Rather, it returns the problem to the proper 
place where it should be investigated – the field of traditional moral 
philosophy. If neurofeedback-based moral enhancement incites moral 
relativism as an actual threat to global society, then the problem of the 
notion of morality becomes a pressing issue not only for us but also for 
moral philosophers.  
Related to the third advantage, the threat of moralization and 
medicalization needs to be considered. For decades, conceptual and 
political efforts have been devoted, on one hand, to remove from the 
psychological and psychiatric approaches and treatments of mental 
disorders the tendency to moralize mental disorders and its undesired 
consequences, and, on the other hand, to remove from our society the 
tendency to medicalize morally different people and their cultures. However, 
these two different issues – the treatment of mental disorders and the 
moral correction – may overlap with each other by the emergence of 
neurofeedback-based moral enhancement. From antiquity to the present, 
the relationship between them has conceptually been considered both 
positively (Jaeger 1957; Martin 2006) and negatively (Foucault 1961; 
Szasz 2010; Wiseman 2014). However, the threat that the emergence of 
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neurofeedback-based moral enhancement may bring is not merely 
conceptual, but also practical. The fact that the same device with the 
same procedure can be successfully used for controlling both mental and 
moral states may lead people to identify mental disorders with moral 
deficits and assume that moral differences are the subject of treatment. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Recent neurofeedback techniques will enable a new type of moral 
bioenhancement that does not require any specific notion of morality. 
On one hand, this will advance the moral bioenhancement debate. 
However, on the other hand, it will introduce new neuroethical issues, 
some of which may become real threats to our society. The discussion 
that this study provides is not decisive for demonstrating 
neurofeedback-based moral bioenhancement to be socially feasible. 
Further neuroethical examination is required. 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Amano, K., K. Shibata, M. Kawato, Y. Sasaki, and T. Watanabe (2016). “Learning to 
associate orientation with color in early visual areas by associative decoded fMRI 
neurofeedback.” Current Biology, 26(14): 1861-6. 
Aristotle (1998). Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W. D. Ross, revised by J. L. Ackrill, 
and J. O. Urmson. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Bartholdy, S., P. Musiat, I. C. Campbell, and U. Schmidt (2013). “The potential of 
neurofeedback in the treatment of eating disorders: A review of the literature.” 
European Eating Disorders Review, 21: 456-63. 
Bentham, J. (1789). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: 
T. Payne. 
Carter, J., and E. Gordon (2015). “On cognitive and moral enhancement: A reply to 
Savulescu and Persson.” Bioethics, 29(3): 153-61. 
Chapin, H., E. Bagarinao, and S. Mackey (2012). “Real-time fMRI applied to pain 
management.” Neuroscience Letter, 520(2): 174-81. 
deCharms, R. C. (2008). “Applications of real-time fMRI.” Nature Review of Neuroscience, 
9(9): 720-9. 
NEUROFEEDBACK-BASED MORAL ENHANCEMENT AND THE NOTION OF MORALITY 39 
deCharms, R. C., F. Maeda, G. H. Glover, D. Ludlow, J. M. Pauly, D. Soneji, J. D. E. 
Gabrieli, and S. C. Mackey (2005). “Control over brain activation and pain 
learned by using real-time functional MRI.” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 102(51): 18626-31. 
Cooper, R. (2007). Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science. Stocksfield, UK: Acumen. 
Cox, R. W., L. Subramanian, D. Linden, M. Lührs, R. McNamara, R. Playle, K. Hood, G. 
Watson, J. Whittaker, R. Sakhuja, N. Ihssen (2016). “Neurofeedback training for 
alcohol dependence versus treatment as usual: study protocol for a randomized 
controlled trial.” Trials, 17: 480. 
Crutchfield, P. (2016). “Decoded neurofeedback is unlikely to enhance moral capacities.” 
American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience, 7(2): 125-6. 
Foucault, M. (1961). Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique. Paris: Plon. 
Gordijn, B. and A. M. Buyx (2010). “Neural engineering.” In Scientific and Philosophical 
Perspectives in Neuroethics, J. Giordano, and B. Gordijn (eds.), 283–301. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Gyngell, C. and S. Easteal (2015). “Cognitive diversity and moral enhancement.” The 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 24(1): 66-74. 
Harris, J. and J. Savulescu (2015). “A debate about moral enhancement.” Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 24(1): 8-22. 
Harris, J. (2016). “Moral blindness – the gift of the god machine.” Neuroethics, 9(3): 269-73. 
Horstkötter, D. (2016). “The ethics of novel neurotechnologies: Focus on research ethics 
and on moral values.” American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience, 7(2): 123-4. 
Jadad, A. R. (1998). Randomized Controlled Trials: A User’s Guide. London, UK: BMJ Books. 
Jaeger, W. (1957). “Aristotle’s use of medicine as model of method in his Ethics.” The 
Journal of Hellenistic Studies, 77(1): 54-61. 
Jotterand, F. and J. Giordano (2015). “Real-time functional magnetic resonance Imaging-
Brain-Computer interfacing in the assessment and treatment of psychopathy: 
Potential and challenges.” In Handbook of Neuroethics, J. Clausen and N. Levy (eds.), 
763-81. New York, NY: Springer. 
Kabasenche, W. P. (2016). “Moral formation and moral enhancement.” American Journal 
of Bioethics: Neuroscience, 7(2): 130-1. 
Kant, I. (1788). Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Riga: J. F. Hartknoch. 
LaConte, S. M. (2011). “Decoding fMRI brain states in real-time.” Neuroimage, 56(2): 440-54. 
Linden, D. E., I. Habes, S. J. Johnston, S. Linden, R. Tatineni, L. Subramanian, B. Sorger, 
D. Healy, and R. Goebel (2012). “Real-time self-regulation of emotion networks in 
patients with depression.” PLoS One, 7(6): e38115. 
Martin, M. (2006). From Morality to Mental Health: Virtue and Vice in a Therapeutic Culture. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Marzbani, H., H. R. Marateb, and M. Mansourian (2016). “Neurofeedback: A comprehensive 
review on system design, methodology and clinical applications.” Basic and 
Clinical Neuroscience, 7(2): 143-58. 
Maslen, H. and J. Savulescu (2016). “Neurofeedback for moral enhancement: 
Irreversibility, freedom, and advantages over drugs.” American Journal of Bioethics: 
Neuroscience, 7(2): 120-2. 
KOJI TACHIBANA 40 
McKenny, G. P. (1998). “Enhancements and the ethical significance of vulnerability.” In: 
Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and social implications, E. Parens (ed.), 222-37. 
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Moll, J., J. H. Weingartner, P. Bado, R. Basilio, J. R. Sato, B. R. Melo, I. E. Bramati, R. de 
Oliveira-Souza, and R. Zahn (2014). “Voluntary enhancement of neural signatures of 
affiliative emotion using fMRI neurofeedback.” PLoS One, 9(5): e97343. 
Nakazawa, E., K. Yamamoto, K. Tachibana, T. Soichiro, Y. Takimoto, and A. Akabayashi 
(2016). “Ethics of decoded neurofeedback in clinical research, treatment, and 
moral enhancement.” American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience, 7(2): 110-7. 
Noble, S., M. N. Spann, F. Tokoglu, X. Shen, R. T. Constable, and D. Scheinost (2017). 
“Influences on the Test–retest reliability of functional connectivity MRI and its 
relationship with behavioral utility.” Cerebral Cortex, 27(11): 5415-29. 
Norman, K. A., S. M. Polyn, G. J. Detre, and J. V. Haxby (2006). “Beyond mind-reading: 
Multi-voxel pattern analysis of fMRI data.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(9): 424-30. 
Parens, E. (1995). “The goodness of fragility: On the prospect of genetic technologies 
aimed at the enhancement of human capacities.” Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal, 5(2): 141-53. 
Persson, I. and J. Savulescu. (2016). “Moral bioenhancement, freedom and reason.” 
Neuroethics, 9(3): 263-8. 
Robbins, J. (2008). A Symphony in the Brain: A Newly Revised and Expanded Edition. New 
York, NY: Grover Press. 
Ruiz S., S. Lee, S. R. Soekadar, A. Caria, R. Veit, T. Kircher, N. Birbaumer, and R. Sitaram 
(2013). “Acquired self-control of insula cortex modulates emotion recognition and 
brain network connectivity in schizophrenia.” Human Brain Mapping, 34(1): 200-12. 
Savulescu, J., A. Sandberg, and G. Kahane (2011). “Well-Being and Enhancement.” In 
Enhancing Human Capacities, J. Savulescu, R. Meulen and G. Kahane (eds.), 1-18. 
Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Scheinost, D., T. Stoica, J. Saksa, X. Papademetris, R. T. Constable, C. Pittenger, and M. 
Hampson (2013). “Orbitofrontal cortex neurofeedback produces lasting changes 
in contamination anxiety and resting-state connectivity.” Translational Psychiatry, 
30(3): e250. 
Scharnowski, F. and N. Weiskopf (2015). “Cognitive enhancement through real-time 
fMRI neurofeedback.” Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 4: 122-7. 
Shibata, K. (2012). “A new neuroscientific approach using decoded neurofeedback 
(DecNef).” Clinical Neurology, 52: 1185-7 (in Japanese.) 
Shibata K., T. Watanabe, M. Kawato, and Y. Sasaki (2016). “Differential activation 
patterns in the same brain region led to opposite emotional states.” PLoS Biology, 
14(9): e1002546. doi:10.1371/journal. pbio.1002546. 
Shibata, K., T. Watanabe, Y. Sasaki, and M. Kawato (2011). “Perceptual learning incepted 
by decoded fMRI neurofeedback without stimulus presentation.” Science, 
334(6061): 1413-5. 
Shook, J. R. (2012). “Neuroethics and the possible types of moral enhancement.” 
American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience, 3(4): 3-14. 
NEUROFEEDBACK-BASED MORAL ENHANCEMENT AND THE NOTION OF MORALITY 41 
Sitaram, R., S. Lee, S. Ruiz, M. Rana, R. Veit, and N. Birbaumer (2011). “Real-time 
support vector classification and feedback of multiple emotional brain states.” 
Neuroimage, 56(2): 753-65. 
Sitaram, R., T. Ros, L. Stoeckel, S. Haller, F. Scharnowski, J. Lewis-Peacock, N. Weiskopf, 
M. L. Blefari, M. Rana, E. Oblak, N. Birbaumer, and J. Sulzer (2017). “Closed-loop 
brain training: The science of neurofeedback.” Nature Review Neuroscience, 18: 86-100. 
Socaciu, E. M. and R. Uszkai (2015). “How drug patents might lead to disincentives for 
moral bioenhancement.” Ethics in Biology, Engineering and Medicine: An International 
Journal, 6(1-2): 125-37. 
Sparrow, R. 2014. “Egalitarianism and moral bioenhancement.” American Journal of 
Bioethics, 14(4): 20-8. 
Subramanian, L., J. V. Hindle, S. Johnston, M. V. Roberts, M. Husain, R. Goebel, and D. 
Linden (2011). “Real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging neurofeedback 
for treatment of Parkinson’s disease.” Journal of Neuroscience, 31(45): 16309-17. 
Szasz, T. (2010). The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. 
New York, NY: Harper Perennial. 
Tachibana, K. (2009). “Can moral enhancement be a subject of neuroethics? Neuroethics 
and the governance of brain science.” Departmental Bulletin of Department of 
History and Philosophy of Science, University of Tokyo, 11: 1-35 (in Japanese.) 
Watanabe, T., Y. Sasaki, K. Shibata, and M. Kawato (2017). “Advances in fMRI real-time 
neurofeedback.” Trends in Cognitive Neurosciences, < http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics. > 
2017.09.010. 
Weiskopf, N. (2012). “Real-time fMRI and its application to neurofeedback.” Neuroimage, 
62(2): 682-92. 
Winder, A. T., C. Echagarruga, Q. Zhang, and P. J. Drew (2017). “Weak correlations 
between hemodynamic signals and ongoing neural activity during the resting 
state.” Nature Neuroscience, doi:10.1038/s41593-017-0007-y 
Wiseman, H. (2014). “Moral enhancement – ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms.” The American Journal 
of Bioethics, 14(4): 48-9. 
Yamada, T., R. Hashimoto, N. Yahata, N. Ichikawa, Y. Yoshihara, Y. Okamoto, N. Kato, 
H. Takahashi, and M. Kawato (2017). “Resting-state functional connectivity-based 
biomarkers and functional MRI-based neurofeedback for psychiatric disorders: a 
challenge for developing theranostic biomarkers.” International Journal of 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 20(10): 769-81. 
Yamashita, A., S. Hayasaka, M. Kawato, and H. Imamizu (2017). “Connectivity 
neurofeedback training can differentially change functional connectivity and 
cognitive performance.” Cerebral Cortex, 27(10): 4960-70. 
Young, K. D., G. J. Siegle, V. Zotev, R. Phillips, M. Misaki, H. Yuan, W. C. Drevets, and J. 
Bodurka (2017). “Randomized clinical trial of real-time fMRI amygdala neurofeedback 
for major depressive disorder: Effects on symptoms and autobiographical memory 
recall.” The American Journal of Psychiatry, doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2017.16060637 
Zotev, V., F. Krueger, R. Phillips, R. P. Alvarez, W. Kyle Simmons, P. Bellgowan, W. C. 
Drevets, and J. Bodurka (2011). “Self-regulation of amygdala activation using 
real-time fMRI neurofeedback.” PLos One, 6(9): e24522.
